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While we perceive events in our environment through
multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all
of these events as occupying a single unified timeline.
Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing
accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the
perceived unity of time must be constructed by inte-
grating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities.
However, existing accounts of multimodal integration
do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is
needed. I finish the paper by articulating the hurdles
that must be overcome to provide an account of the
perceived unity of time.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
It is the shared duty of the various sensory systems to tell us how events in our environment
are temporally structured. Through vision, audition, taste, touch, smell, and whatever other
sensory systems we possess, we learn about when things occur around us. Yet, despite gathering
this information through various sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive time as unified. The
world appears to consist of a single timeline within which all of the events we perceive occur. It
is in this way that there is a perceived unity to time.
This paper has two goals. First, to show that standard accounts of the perceived unity of
time fail. Second, to articulate the explanatory hurdles that any adequate account of the per-
ceived unity of time must overcome in explaining how temporal information is integrated
across modalities and timescales. Acknowledging these hurdles reveals a host of questions
about temporal perception that have not been directly addressed in the philosophical and scien-
tific literature.
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The paper goes as follows. Section 2 provides a characterization of the perceived unity of
time as a target for explanation. Section 3 lays out the standard accounts of the perceived unity
of time. While they differ in their details, both accounts share a common strategy. They first
provide a general explanation of how perception attributes temporal properties to perceived
events (e.g., perceiving events as having durations or as standing in temporal relations to other
events), and then, from this general attributive story, an explanation of the perceived unity of
time supposedly emerges more or less straightforwardly. Section 4 argues that any account of
the perceived unity of time adopting this strategy is bound to fail. Temporal perception is com-
posed of initially fragmented timekeeping capacities and the explanation of the perceived unity
of time must explain how these fragmented capacities are appropriately coordinated with one
another. Section 5 draws out parallels that emerge between temporal and spatial perception
and argues that the integration of temporal information across modalities must differ in signifi-
cant ways from integration of spatial information. Finally, Section 6 articulates the explanatory
challenges that any account of the perceived unity of time must overcome.
2 | DESCRIBING THE PERCEIVED UNITY OF TIME
When we, conceptually sophisticated adults, reflect on the world, the world appears to contain
a single temporal dimension within which all of the events we perceive occur.1 How do we
explain this appearance? Why does the world seem to contain a single timeline and not multi-
ple timelines associated with different modalities? This is the core of the perceived unity of time
that will be the focus of this paper. In this section, we will do some unpacking to better grasp
this target phenomenon.2
The first thing to notice is that the phenomenon at issue here is not a purely introspective or
phenomenological one. The perceived unity of time concerns how the world appears to be tem-
porally structured, and only in so far as our experiences seem to occur within the world, also
speaks to how experiences seem to be temporally structured. When you leave your house, the
thought that you forgot your keys might pop into mind after you hear the door click behind
you. When we reflect on this episode, our thought coming to mind, that introspectively accessed
event, seems to sit in the same timeline as the other events in the world that we perceive. It is
the appearance of this unified timeline of events in the world that is our focus.
We can break down the target phenomenon into two separate perceptual capacities. First,
there is what I will call temporal localization (or localization). We do not merely perceive events
as having temporal structure, but we perceive events as being located in time relative to the pre-
sent. Attending a musical performance, some things will seem to be occurring now (e.g., the
sound of the sustained guitar), others will seem to have occurred at some point in the past
(e.g., the initial sound of the note being struck), and often enough, we will have expectations
that certain events will occur at some specific moment in the future (e.g., when the chorus will
begin and the movements of the musicians will change). The perceived unity of time involves
more than the appearance of a single timeline, but it involves the perception, across modalities
1Without access to how things appear to infants and non-linguistic creatures, the reflective evidence discussed here is
restricted to language using adults.
2Aspects of the perceived unity of time, notably what I call localization, were described by Dennett and
Kinsbourne (1992). While their primary aim was to debunk a particular theory of consciousness, the multiple drafts
model (MDM) of consciousness they develop bears similarities to an account of the perceived unity of time suggested
towards the end of Section 6.
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and timescales, of events as being located at specific moments in that timeline relative to the
present moment.
Second, there is what I will call comparability. We seem to have no introspectively available
difficulties in comparing temporal properties across timescales and modalities. We can readily
compare the duration of a seen flash of lightning and a heard crash of thunder. This is possible
even though they are perceived through different modalities and at different timescales—
milliseconds through seconds. Furthermore, when we compare these properties, we seem to
understand them as being the same kinds of properties—temporal properties. In part, the taking
of these properties as being of the same kind is a phenomenological datum. These experiences
seem to have something phenomenally in common qua their being temporal experiences.3 This
contrasts with our abilities to make comparisons across magnitude types more generally. When
asked subjects can compare the intensity of a flash of light with the intensity of a sound, and
their responses show at least some intrapersonal stability (Spence, 2011). However, even though
we can make these cross-magnitude-type comparisons, there is a lingering awkwardness to
them. There is a sense that the compared intensities are not of the same type. There seems to be
a phenomenologically difference in the intensity of a sound and the intensity of a light. This lin-
gering awkwardness is missing in the temporal case. We understand in the temporal case that
the magnitudes being compared are all temporal properties regardless of which modality is used
to detect them and over what timescale they occur.
While I have characterized localization and comparability in terms of first-person report,
evidence for similar capacities can be found in the behaviors of human and non-human ani-
mals. Consider localization. To coordinate behaviors with events in the world, we need to
gather information about when events are occurring and we need to be able to predict when
events will occur. Think of what it takes to dance with a partner. You see and feel their move-
ments and hear the music. Your movements have to be coordinated with the temporal informa-
tion gathered through all of these different senses and your expectations of when the music and
your partner's movements will change so that you know when and how to move. Many activi-
ties require similar localization. Consider what it takes for a predator to intercept prey. Some
sharks, for instance, integrate information from their various senses to fix when to attack
(Gardiner, Atema, Hueter, & Motta, 2014). Furthermore, for representations of when events
occur to coordinate behaviors, they must locate events in egocentric temporal orderings, that is,
relative to now. To anthropomorphize the situation, knowing that some event will occur at
noon will not allow you to coordinate your behaviors with that event, unless you know how far
from now noon is.4 So, we have some reason for thinking that humans and non-humans locate
events in time relative to the current moment to control behavior.
Let us consider the behavioral evidence for comparability by first noting an important con-
trast. A general finding on how animals, including humans, represent magnitudes is that there
is a complex pattern of interactions between representations of different magnitude types. These
patterns involve cases where the representation of a particular value for one magnitude-type
distorts the representation of other magnitude-types (Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004;
Walsh, 2003). To give just one example, displays with more objects in them are often perceived
as having longer durations (Javadi & Aichelburg, 2012). While we can quantify the extent to
which these different magnitude representations influence one another, we need not think
these interactions increase the reliability of the representation of either magnitude type.
3Thank you to a referee for emphasizing this point.
4The point is similar to Perry’s in The problem of the essential indexical (1979).
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Instead, the interaction supposedly arises as a quirk of the machinery that underlies magnitude
representation and behavior.5 However, crossmodal temporal representations often do interact
in ways that seem to facilitate reliably representing the world. To take one example, in a study
by De Corte and Matell (2016), rats were trained to expect food at a particular location 10 sec-
onds after a visual cue and 20 seconds after an auditory cue. The rats were then presented with
a combination of the auditory and visual cues. What was observed was that the rats showed an
expectation that the food would appear after 15 seconds. Unlike the pattern of cross modality
type effects, these temporal representations interacted in ways that make sense if the perceptual
system is aiming at integrating them to reliably represent the world—that is, the representa-
tions were treated as providing information about the same type of property in the world. This
is what we would expect from comparability.
It may turn out that the reflective and behavioral evidence point to distinct phenomena.
One's expectation of how that will turn out may trade on general assumptions about the divi-
sion between perception for action and perception for awareness. However, we can remain neu-
tral on this point since the important thing to notice is that humans and non-humans must
have some way of integrating temporal information across modalities and timescales that
allows for comparability and localization.
Two final points of clarification. First, what has been described so far is best understood as a
competence or capacity. We are typically capable of locating events in time and making com-
parisons between instances of temporal properties. However, there are well known cases where
we systematically fail to do so properly. For instance, we typically judge sounds as having lon-
ger durations than visual stimuli with the same objective durations (Wearden, Edwards,
Fakhri, & Percival, 1998). Similarly, at very short interstimulus intervals, we can perceive a pair
of events as being non-simultaneous, but fail to reliably perceive which event came first
(Poppel, 1988).6 In both cases, there is a performance failure—we fail to properly compare or
locate temporal properties—that is revealed through empirical, not introspective, means. How-
ever, we often perform well in similar tasks, and the competence itself requires explanation. It
is this general capacity that will be the focus of this paper.
Second, there are similarities between this paper's target and Molyneux's question. Is time
represented via an amodal format, that is shared by the different modalities and to which no
single modality has a unique claim, or is time represented multimodally, in that each modality
represents time in a modality specific way (Richardson, 2014)? Nothing in the characterization
of the perceived unity of time demands that we make a decision about this at this moment. Sim-
ilarly, nothing in the characterization of the perceived unity of time, as studied in animals or
adults, provides us with an answer to Molyneux's question with regards to time. Will a newly
sighted person, for instance, be able to compare a seen duration with a felt one? In laying out
the target phenomenon, we should remain open that this question may be answered either
way. However, as we shall see in Section 4, I will argue that some temporal properties are repre-
sented amodally while others are represented multimodally. Therefore, we have some reasons
to doubt that Molyneux's question can be given a common answer for all aspects of temporal
experience.7
5For different explanations of this “quirk” see (Pinel et al., 2004; Walsh, 2003). In some cases the quirk might be
beneficial, in others not.
6For another case involving localization failures, see Holcombe (2015).
7This is in contrast to Richardson (2014). Thank you to a referee and Jacob Berger for raising the connection between
the target of this paper and Molyneux’s Problem.
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3 | THE STANDARD APPROACHES
Most accounts of the perceived unity of time adopt one of two general approaches—internal
clock approaches and mirroring approaches. Despite their differences, these approaches share a
common strategy. First, they provide a general explanation for how perception attributes tem-
poral properties to perceived events. Then, from that attributive story, an explanation of the per-
ceived unity of time emerges straightforwardly. Nothing further needs to be posited to account
for the perceived unity of time over and above what is posited in the explanation of how tempo-
ral properties are attributed to events. In this section, we will look at these two approaches.
Since the aim of this paper is to show that any account of the perceived unity of time that
adopts this general strategy is bound to fail, I will not be considering whether these accounts
succeed by their own lights.
3.1 | Internal clock approaches
Our initial sensory responses to the world are largely controlled by external events impacting
our sensory transducers. When you see a flash of light, photons impact the retina and a flurry
of visual processes begin to unfold. When the light disappears those visual processes soon end.
According to internal clock approaches, these initial sensory responses to events in the world
do not themselves represent the temporal properties of those events. Instead, the temporal con-
tents of perception are contributed by an internal clock that monitors the timing of these proxi-
mal sensory processes, and on the basis of the temporal measurements of those processes,
perception as a whole attributes temporal properties to perceived events. While different ver-
sions of the internal clock model have been developed over the years, we will focus on scalar
expectancy theory (SET) (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984) since it is arguably the most influen-
tial internal clock model in the literature.8
The original variant of SET accounted for the perception of time through a three-component
system involving a supramodal pacemaker-accumulator clock, a memory store, and a decision/
comparator mechanism. The pacemaker produces pulses at a regular rate that are tallied by an
accumulator system. Since the pulses are produced at a regular rate the total number of pulses
tallied during some interval provides a measurement of the duration of that interval. It is this
supramodal pacemaker-accumulator mechanism that is used to measure the temporal proper-
ties of the various modality specific sensory processes. These initial measurements, represented
via total number of accumulated pulses, are then compared to stored pulse-based measure-
ments for either particular events or averaged measurements for event types (Jones &
Wearden, 2003). The result of the comparison is a relative duration judgment in which the cur-
rent measured event is determined to be longer than, shorter than, or of equal duration to the
measurement in memory. On the basis of this entire process, temporal properties are attributed
to the events in the world responsible for producing the proximal sensory responses measured
by the internal clock. This system, that primarily represents interval durations, can attribute a
range of temporal properties to events in the world. Temporal order is given in terms of the
interval separating event boundaries. Properties like rhythm, rate, and so forth, are attributed
by applying simple mathematical operations on initial interval representations (Gallistel, 1990).
8Similar arguments could be raised against other internal clock models like the striatal beat frequency model (Matell &
Meck, 2004).
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In this way, we have a general story for how perception attributes various temporal properties
to events across modalities and timescales.
The transition from the attributive story to an explanation of the perceived unity of time can
be summed up in slogan form—the unity of the timekeeping mechanism accounts for the per-
ceived unity of time. Comparability is easily accounted for. Since durations, for instance, are all
encoded via that same pulse-based supramodal timekeeping system, which already includes a
mechanism for comparing pulse-based measurements, there is nothing to distinguish
crossmodal from intramodal comparisons of temporal properties. Only the inputs to the central-
ized timekeeper differ between the crossmodal and intramodal cases. Localization is explained
through the single supramodal clock mechanism that provides a common temporal ordering
for all of the events that we perceive. Events are then located within this temporal ordering by
noting the length of the interval that separates the particular event from the current moment.
Nothing is needed beyond the attributive machinery to explain the perceived unity of time.
Other variants of SET replace the single supramodal pacemaker-accumulator mechanism
with modality specific clock mechanisms as part of the overall timekeeping system (Chen &
Yeh, 2009; Wearden et al., 1998). This move is largely motivated by observed variation in the
precision of temporal perception across modalities. For instance, each sensory modality has a
different minimum ISI needed to reliably perceive two stimuli as non-simultaneous
(Poppel, 1988). Similarly, discrimination thresholds for interval lengths differ depending on the
modality of the stimuli marking interval boundaries (Grondin, 2003). To account for these dif-
ferences, the move is to posit modality specific clocks that pulse at difference rates (see discus-
sion in Chen & Yeh, 2009). From here, the attributive story remains much the same. Initial
measurements produced by pacemaker-accumulator mechanisms are compared to stored mea-
surements, and these comparisons are the basis for the attribution of temporal properties to per-
ceived events.
Once we introduce modality specific clocks with differing pulse rates, we get an explanation
for the variation in timekeeping precision across modalities. More precise modalities, like audi-
tion, have clocks with faster pulse rates. However, this causes a problem for comparability,
since N-pulses from the auditory clock will represent a different duration than N-pulses from a
slower clock, such as vision's. In fact, there is evidence of increased variability in temporal
judgements when subjects are asked to make crossmodal comparisons (Penney, Gibbon, &
Meck, 2000; Zhang & Zhou, 2017). Nevertheless, a simple multiplication operation can allow
for a normalized means of encoding temporal information via a common code. The result is
that despite the differences in the initial pulse-based codes, a common pulse-based code is easily
obtained (we can remain neutral as to whether this is an amodal code). Therefore, the very
same explanation of comparability is given in the modal specific clock version of SET as was
given in the single clock variant.
Localization, however, requires more than just modality specific clocks. Consider what is
required for the attribution of crossmodal temporal relations—such as the temporal interval
separating a flash of lightning and a crash of thunder. Within an internal clock framework, one
would have to introduce a supramodal clock mechanism to make these attributions (for
instance, this is done by Klink, Montijn, & van Wezel, 2011).9
9This section concerns pure internal clock accounts. Pure clock-based accounts of temporal perception must introduce
supramodal clock mechanisms. However, nothing stops an internal clock theorist from introducing the sort of
crossmodal mechanisms described in Section 4.2. Hybrid versions like this are closer to what I endorse, however, the
evidence presented in Section 4 suggests much more variation in timekeeping mechanisms than mere modal specificity.
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So, on this internal clock approach to temporal perception, we attribute temporal properties
to events in the world through a combination of modality specific and supramodal clock mech-
anisms.10 Localization is accounted for by this supramodal clock mechanism in the same way
as it was in the single clock variant of SET. The supramodal clock not only provides a common
temporal order for all of the events that we perceive but also provides a means of locating
events within that ordering. Once again, nothing is needed over and above the attributive
machinery to account for the perceived unity of time.
3.2 | Mirroring approaches
The other approach to explaining the perceived unity of time appeals directly to the temporal
properties of sensory processes themselves. According to mirroring approaches, the temporal con-
tents of perception (or experience) mirror the temporal properties of perceptual (or experiential)
processes themselves.11 To see understand the approach, consider the following example.12
Imagine an approaching thunderstorm. When the storm is far away, the flashes of lightning will
appear to occur prior to the crashes of thunder. As the storm approaches, the apparent gap between
the lightning and thunder shrinks, until the thunder and lightning appear simultaneous. According to
the mirroring approach, perception is able to represent these changing temporal relations in virtue of
the changes in the temporal relations between experiences of the lightning and experiences of the
thunder. As the perceived gap shrinks there will be a corresponding (i.e., mirroring) shrink in the
actual temporal interval between experiences (or the corresponding perceptual states). The account
can then be generalized beyond temporal order to all of the temporal contents in perception.Wemight
perceive the thunder as lingering longer than the short strike of lightning, and this too will mirror the
relative durations of the experiences of thunder and the experiences of lightning. Through this
mirroring, perception latches onto and attributes temporal properties to perceived events.
If we adopt a mirroring approach, then, once again, we have a simple explanation of the
perceived unity of time.13 All that is needed to get this explanation of the perceived unity of
10Maniadakis and Trahanias (2016) develop a similar account inspired by striatal beat frequency models.
11For examples see Arstila (2015), Dainton (2000), Foster (1991), Mellor (1981), Phillips (2014), Rashbrook (2013). These
authors do not maintain that experience having a particular temporal property is sufficient for that property appearing
as part of the experience’s content. Rather, they claim that it is necessary that if experience has a certain temporal
content, then the experience’s temporal structure will mirror this content. Something else makes a certain temporal
property of experience part of its content. Nevertheless, mirroring plays a content enabling role. Without the appropriate
mirroring, experience could not have its temporal contents. Some (Arstila, 2015; Foster, 1991; Mellor, 1981), go further,
suggesting that mirroring plays a content determining role, in that the temporal contents of experience are determined
by some subset of the temporal properties of experience itself (for instance, the duration of an experience may
determine duration content, while the date on which an experience occurs would not be reflected in experience). On
either interpretation, similar accounts of temporal unity are possible, and the same objections raised in the next
section would apply. See Lee (2014) and Watzl (2012) for general criticisms of mirroring views.
12This section’s goal is to assess the mirroring view’s account of the perceived unity of time. I am granting that
consumer systems can utilize information carried by the timing of sensory processes. A referee pointed out that granting
them this may be too generous since a challenge raised in this paper is to provide an account of how temporal
information is transformed into a format usable by consumer systems. Lee (2014) has argued this story ultimately
undermines mirroring accounts.
13While the phenomena might ultimately be related, the perceived unity of time should be distinguished from the
phenomenal unity of consciousness (Bayne & Chalmers, 2003). While some theorists discussed in this section, for
example, Dainton and Rashbrook, argue that mirroring cannot account for the phenomenal unity of consciousness,
they nevertheless appeal to mirroring to account for the perceived unity of time.
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time off the ground is a simple assumption about the metaphysics of time. Since our modality
specific sensory processes themselves occur within the single timeline of events in the world—
that is our metaphysical assumption—then we can explain why the world appears to be tempo-
rally unified by appealing to the unity of time itself. Modality specific perceptual processes
occurring at particular moments in a single worldly timeline. This accounts for localization
since the appearance of events as occupying a common timeline is inherited from our experi-
ences occupying a single timeline. Comparability is also explained by the general mirroring
principle. Any consumer system capable of making use of the temporal contents encoded in
one modality must be able to exploit the temporal properties of those sensory processes, since
these are the proximal physical properties of the perceptual system in virtue of which percep-
tion attributes temporal properties to perceived events. However, it is the very same type of tem-
poral property across perceptual systems that carries this content. Therefore, any consumer
system capable of making use of the temporal information encoded in one modality can, in
principle, utilize the temporal information found in the other modalities (provided it has access
to the relevant sensory processes). Comparing temporal properties of events detected through
different modalities simply involves comparing the temporal properties of more proximal sen-
sory processes. Once again, nothing over and above the machinery needed to account for how
temporal properties are attributed to events in the world is needed to account for the perceived
unity of time.14
At this point, it is useful to notice a common feature to the internal clock and mirroring
accounts of the perceived unity of time. In both cases, temporal perception is conceived as a sin-
gle psychological phenomenon (or at least, a sufficiently homogenous assortment of phenom-
ena). As a result, a general story for how perception attributes temporal properties to perceived
events seems plausible. Once we have this general story, then the perceived unity of time is eas-
ily explained since there will be something like a common code in which perception encodes
temporal information. In some cases, researchers are explicit about why they think this. For
instance, a recent paper (Hartcher-O'Brien, Brighouse, & Levitan, 2016) argues that a good rea-
son for pursuing a unified mechanism/explanation that underpins temporal perception is that
the various temporal properties that we perceive appear so intimately related to one another.
That is, from an observation of the perceived unity of time, it is assumed that temporal percep-
tion is a singular psychological phenomenon, which gives rise to these sorts of approaches for
understanding the perceived unity of time. In the next section, this assumption that temporal
perception is a singular psychological phenomenon will be at issue.
4 | THE FRAGMENTATION OF TEMPORAL PERCEPTION
In the first part of this section, I will argue that “temporal perception” does not pick out a single
psychological capacity. It instead acts as an umbrella term picking out various timekeeping
capacities that are specialized for specific aspects of the temporal structure of the world. Then,
by looking at two specific timekeeping capacities, I will argue that temporal perception employs
mechanisms that represent time in radically different ways. Therefore, no general story about
how perceptual systems attribute temporal properties to perceived events is possible. Therefore,
14How mirroring theorists account for comparability is often unclear. Some, like Phillips (2012), introduce a type of
internal clock to exploit the timing of perceptual processes. Others, like (Arstila, 2015), appeal to a comparator
mechanism.
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the standard accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, an account of the perceived
unity of time must explain how the unity of time is constructed from initially fragmented time-
keeping capacities.
The situation regarding temporal perception parallels what occurred in the literature on
memory. Memory was initially understood as a single psychological capacity to retain informa-
tion for later use. However, as research progressed, memory was no longer seen as a single
capacity. Instead it was seen as various different psychological phenomena to be studied on
their own terms (Craver, 2007). A general theory of memory was abandoned. Instead, theorists
attempted to understand how specific forms of memory operate and how forms of memory
might interact. The same goes for temporal perception. We cannot generalize from one time-
keeping capacity to another. Instead, we must theorize about each capacity on its own terms
and then uncover how these capacities interact.
This section describes ways in which specific timekeeping capacities can be selectively inter-
vened upon while leaving other timekeeping capacities unaffected. The conclusion is that time-
keeping capacities come apart along at least three different dimensions—timescales, modalities,
and temporal-property-types.15
Pharmacological and mechanical interventions provide evidence for timescale specific divi-
sions among timekeeping capacities. For instance, haloperidol and midazolam both impair tem-
poral discriminations at around the one-second timescale, however, of the two, only haloperidol
also impairs discriminations around 50 ms (Rammsayer, 1999). Similar dissociations are found
through the use of rTMS. Applied to dorsal frontal areas, rTMS selectively impairs discrimina-
tions around one second (Jones, Rosenkranz, Rothwell, & Jahanshahi, 2004), while rTMS applied
to the cerebellum selectively impairs discriminations in the millisecond range (Koch et al., 2007).
Psychophysics experiments show that timekeeping capacities can be selectively intervened
upon along modality and temporal property-type dimensions. Consider first modality specific
cases. It is well known that saccades distort the perception of the temporal properties of visual
stimuli presented at the target location of the saccade during a short temporal window centered
on saccade execution (Burr, Tozzi, & Morrone, 2007). When a single visual target is presented
during this window at the appropriate location, subjects perceive the target as having a com-
pressed duration. When a sequence-pair of stimuli is similarly presented, subjects often perceive
a reversal of their objective temporal order. Importantly, saccades only influence the perception
of visual stimuli. Auditory stimuli, for instance, presented alongside the visual ones do not
undergo corresponding distortions.
Psychophysics also shows the selective manipulability of temporal property-type specific
capacities, for example, capacities to perceive duration versus sequences, rates, and so forth.
Consider the oddball illusion (Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, & Cavanagh, 2004). Subjects are initially
presented with a series of standard stimuli that are identical with regards to their temporal
properties (e.g., duration, ISI, etc.) and are of the same non-temporal type (e.g., if they are fla-
shes of light, then they will be of the same color, intensity, etc.). After the presentation of the
standard sequence, subjects are shown an oddball, which is identical to the standards with
regards to its temporal properties, but differs in some salient non-temporal way (e.g., it might
be a different colored light). Subjects reliably perceive the oddball as having a significantly lon-
ger duration than the standards (up to 50% longer).
An internal clock theorist could try and account for this dilation through an increase in the
clock pulse-rate due to the novel oddball (this is what Tse et al., 2004 propose). However, if that
15For further evidence see Paton and Buonomano (2018).
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were the case, then the other temporal properties of the oddball should be equally distorted, since
the clock distortion would distort measurements of these other properties. To test this, Eagleman
and colleagues conducted a version of the oddball study, reported in Eagleman (2008), in which
the standards and the oddball flickered at a fixed rate. If the dilation resulted from an increase in
the pulse-rate of a general-purpose clock, then the oddball should seem to flicker more slowly
than the standards. However, the study showed that there was no effect of this sort. Only the per-
ceived duration of the oddball was influenced, not its flicker rate. In this way, timekeeping capac-
ities specialized for specific types of temporal properties can be selectively intervened upon.16
At this point, an important dialectical point needs emphasis. Any of these selective interven-
tions could in principle be explained as resulting from some change in the operation of a single
timekeeping mechanism or the inputs to those mechanisms. Perhaps this is most clear in the
cases of selective distortions along modality specific lines. However, that explanatory strategy
loses plausibility when we consider the full range of cases. Unless our goal was to salvage a cen-
tralized clock model, it is unclear why we should think that the inputs to a centralized clock
would differ along timescale, modality, and temporal property type lines in the way these selec-
tive distortions would require. Furthermore, if there were a centralized clock (or clock network),
then we would expect to find cases where subjects undergo a general disruption to their time-
keeping capacities (in the same way the subjects may lose the ability to perceive faces, surface
color, etc.). However, no cases like that exist.17 Of course, nothing here demands that one aban-
don the idea that there is a centralized clock, however, this is not due to anything specific about
temporal perception but rather, concerns the general underdetermination of theory by data. The
resulting theory would become increasingly ad hoc to accommodate this evidence. Our best, least
ad hoc, explanation, then, is one in which we take temporal perception to be fragmented.
This alone, however, does not show that the standard approaches to the perceived unity of
time fail. These capacities could all employ a common code underpinned by SET-like timekeep-
ing mechanisms. In what follows, we will focus on specific timekeeping capacities and show that
the explanatory demands that are placed on models of those capacities give us good reasons for
thinking that these capacities employ distinct types of representational mechanisms. As a result,
no general account of how perceptual systems attribute temporal properties to events is possible,
and therefore, no account of the perceived unity of time that relies on one can be succeed.
4.1 | Specific timekeeping capacities: Case #1 duration
Let us begin by considering duration perception at very short timescales. Classic approaches to
this capacity have appealed to dedicated clock mechanisms, with SET being a prime example.
Yet, emerging models are doing without dedicated clock mechanisms. Instead, they account for
many rudimentary timekeeping capacities as arising from intrinsic properties of neural systems
throughout the brain (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008; Paton & Buonomano, 2018). Intrinsic models have
16Johnston, Arnold, and Nishida (2006) also show selective distortions of modality and temporal property specific
perception.
17Surveying the literature reveals no cases like this. One explanation for their absence, raised by a referee, is that
impairing a centralized clock may result in an elimination of consciousness altogether. However, this would make
temporal content unique amongst perceptual contents, since most, if not all, perceptual contents seem to be capable of
being impaired while preserving consciousness. Without reasons for thinking temporal perception is unique in these
ways, the absence of general “time blindness”, along with the evidence raised in this section, count against centralized
clock approaches.
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the advantage of providing a ready explanation for highly localized distortions in temporal per-
ception and for why all sensory experiences seem to have some temporal content (i.e., because
this content is provided by the same mechanisms that provides non-temporal content to experi-
ence) all while not having to posit any additional machinery over and above what is already in
place for non-temporal capacities.
For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on a single type of intrinsic model, state-
dependent network models (SDN models).18 The choice of SDN models is meant to be illustrative
of the general trend within the timekeeping literature as the same conclusions could be drawn
from other intrinsic timekeeping models (e.g., Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009; Lebedev,
O'Doherty, & Nicolelis, 2008) or variants of the internal clock models (although, evidence in
favor of the SDN models will be discussed). However time is encoded at short timescales will
contrast sharply with how time is encoded for other timekeeping capacities (e.g., crossmodal
temporal order perception).19 The particular focus on the SDN models is largely due to their
being particularly well-developed variants of these emerging intrinsic models.
According to SDN models, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) underpinning a wide-range of
non-temporal capacities can also underpin rudimentary timekeeping capacities at very short
timescales in the following way: Within each RNN we can distinguish between a system's active
states, which are the different spatial distributions of spiking activity within the network, and
the hidden states, which are the modulatory states of the system that control how the active
states develop over time.20 As a RNN receives input, a particular pattern of active states will
unfold as a function of the incoming signal and the initial hidden states of the network. As time
passes, the system's active states change as a function of the modulatory influence of the hidden
states. As a result, at any given moment there will be a particular subset of neurons within the
RNN that are most active which provides a spatial code for duration without the need for a ded-
icated clock.
Evidence for SDN models comes from a variety of sources. First, as a proof of concept, the
time-dependent activity patterns described by SDN models have been found in artificial RNNs
and with in vitro neural populations (Finnerty, Shadlen, Jazayeri, Nobre, & Buonomano, 2015;
Goel & Buonomano, 2014).
Second, SDN models have accurately predicted a novel pattern of variability in temporal
perception at very short timescales that are only accommodated by other models through the
inclusion of post-hoc assumptions. This variability arises when subjects are presented with a
pair of stimuli and are tested to see how they perceived the duration of the second stimuli
(Buonomano & Karmarkar, 2002; Spencer, Karmarkar, & Ivry, 2009). In one condition, the ISI
between the stimulus pairs was held constant, in the second condition, the ISI varied. Subjects
showed an increased variability in the perceived duration of the second stimuli in the varied-ISI
condition when the stimuli had durations of less than 150 ms. Internal clock accounts did not
predict that variability of this sort would be restricted to these timescales. SDN models did.
Since the particular dynamics of a RNN is not only a function of the incoming sensory signal
but also of the RNN's state when the stimulus arrives, by varying the ISI between the two
18For details of SDN models see Buonomano (2000), Buonomano and Karmarkar (2002), Buonomano and Maass (2009),
Paton and Buonomano (2018).
19Different coding schemes are found in ramping models (Lebedev et al., 2008), oscillation models (Kosem et al., 2014),
and efficiency coding models (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009).
20See Buonomano and Maass (2009), Goel and Buonomano (2014) for details of the interaction between active and
hidden states.
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stimuli, the experiment varied this initial state in unpredictable ways resulting in varied percep-
tual performance.
No dedicated clock mechanism is needed. Instead, local networks have the intrinsic ability
to keep track of some temporal properties of perceived events. Furthermore, since each RNN
will have a different internal structure, each RNN will employ a different spatial coding for tem-
poral information. Finally, since the ability of any RNN to carry information about time is due
to its local stimulus history, it follows that there is no common interval that all RNNs encode
information about. Rather, RNNs look backwards different distances depending on their local
stimulation histories.
One criticism that has often been raised against SDN models, and intrinsic timekeeping
models more generally, is that it is unclear how to scale SDN models for longer timescales and
crossmodal timekeeping (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). However, once we accept that temporal percep-
tion is fragmented, this objection loses its force. All accounts of temporal perception need to
provide a story of cross-timescale and cross-modal integration. This is not unique to intrinsic
models.
4.2 | Specific timekeeping capacities: Case #2 temporal order
Here we will shift focus from duration perception to crossmodal order perception. Models of
this capacity must meet significantly different demands than ones for duration perception. In
particular, any account of temporal order perception must accommodate the perceptual sys-
tem's ability to rapidly recalibrate the perceived temporal order of events. To see what this rec-
alibration is like consider the following two cases.
First, consider a study by Stetson, Cui, Montague, and Eagleman (2006).21 Subjects were
asked to press a button and then after a variable delay, with an average length of 35 ms, a flash
of light would appear on the screen in front of them. Subjects had to respond whether the but-
ton press occurred before or after the flash of light. If the light followed the button press by
approximately 20 ms subjects would be equally likely to report the button press as occurring
earlier than or later than the flash of light. This provided the baseline point of subjective simulta-
neity (PSS) at which the two stimuli appeared simultaneous. A delay was then inserted between
the button press and the flash of light such that the light appeared on average 135 ms after the
button press. After several trials the PSS shifted to where the visual stimulus had to follow the
button press by 44 ms to be perceived as simultaneous. The shifting PSS already showed that
there was some recalibration in perceived temporal order, but the interesting finding came
when the extended delay was abruptly replaced with the original 35 ms delay. Stimulus pairs,
with an ISI of 35 ms, that were originally perceived as involving a flash of light after the button
press were now reliably perceived as though the flash of light occurred before the button press!
Perceived temporal order was reversed despite there being no change in stimulus timing.
For the second case consider a study by (Kösem, Gramfort, & van Wassenhove, 2014). Sub-
jects were presented a pair of stimuli—a pulsing sound and light. Both stimuli pulsed at the
same frequency—1 Hz—but were slightly out of phase with one another. Subjects initially per-
ceived the stimuli as being out of sync, however, subjects quickly began to perceive the two
stimuli as being in phase, despite there being no change in the incoming stimulation.
21For similar findings using other sensory-sensory pairings, see Chen and Vroomen (2013), Navarra, García-Morera, and
Spence (2012), Vroomen and Keetels (2010).
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Two general accounts were proposed to explain these types of effects. In the first, which is
readily accommodated by the internal clock and mirroring approaches, recalibration arises
through a shift in the timing of our sensory processes. The auditory and visual pulses seemed to
synchronize with one another through a synchronizing of the auditory and visual processing of
these stimuli. The second proposal explains these recalibration effects without any shift in the
timing of sensory processes. Instead, a representational mechanism for attributing temporal
relations to the perceived events is recalibrated.
To decide between these accounts, a critical test was performed combining the recalibration
studies with imaging methods to determine whether shifts in perceived temporal order cor-
responded with shifts in the timing of sensory processes. Interestingly, the two cases brought
about conflicting results. In the Stetson et al. study, there was no shift in the latencies of tactile
or visual processing. Instead, there was increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and
medial frontal cortex (regions the authors suggest are involved in conflict monitoring).22 In the
Kosem et al. study, however, there was a corresponding shift in the timing of auditory and
visual processes. Prior to calibration, ERP showed that the auditory and visual processes were
oscillating in step with the oscillations of their respective stimuli. However, after calibration,
the oscillations in the visual and auditory processes fell into phase with one another. While the
explanation for the different effects is not clear, it may have to do with the types of sequences
used in both studies. The Stetson et al. study used non-rhythmic sequences, while the Kosem
et al. study used rhythmic sequences. Since there are reasons for thinking that rhythmic and
non-rhythmic sequence perception engage distinct networks (Grahn & Brett, 2009), the differ-
ent imaging results might be the result of the rhythmic/non-rhythmic difference.
Given the results of the Stetson et al. study, there must be an explanation of perceived tem-
poral order, and its recalibration, that does not directly appeal to the timing of sensory stimula-
tion or initial sensory processing. To explain these effects, researchers often posit a decision/
comparator mechanism based on known perceptual opponency mechanisms (Cai, Stetson, &
Eagleman, 2012; McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, Russo, & Hillyard, 2005; Roach, Heron,
Whitaker, & McGraw, 2011).
The model from Cai et al. (2012) will serve as a nice example of this sort of mechanism.23 A
series of delay tuned neurons respond to particular temporal asynchronies between motor and
visual processing. Think of these as a series of neurons tuned with Gaussian response profiles
centered on these specific asynchronies, for example, motor-leading-visual by 50 ms, 30 ms,
20 ms, 0 ms, −20 ms, and so forth. These delay tuned neurons feed excitatory and inhibitory sig-
nals to a pair of summation nodes. One node receives primarily excitatory signals from motor-
leading neurons and vice versa. This differential input produces opponent behavior in these
summation nodes. In a calibration neutral state, the differential activity in these nodes simply
reflects asynchronies in motor-visual processing. If the activity in the two nodes is identical,
then the motor and visual events are represented as simultaneous. If there is a difference in
activation, then a sequential order is represented, and the relative activity of the nodes encodes
the length of the separating interval.
In models like this, recalibration can occur in several ways. Adaptation can directly influ-
ence the summation nodes, directly changing the encoding of temporal order, or adaptation
22Similar results were found using MEG and EEG (Simon, Noel, & Wallace, 2017; Stekelenburg, Sugano, &
Vroomen, 2011).
23There are different approaches to explaining these recalibration effects, however, they all distinguish the timing of
perceptual processes with represented temporal content which is all we need (Chen & Vroomen, 2013).
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can influence the delay-tuned neurons, influencing the inputs to the summation nodes. Alter-
natively, recalibration can also result from a change in the timing of initial sensory processes,
which will result in differences in the activation of the summation nodes. The model provides
the resources needed to account for both the Stetson et al. and Kosem et al. studies (although,
we need not insist that a single model accounts for all temporal order perception and
recalibration).
The important thing to notice, however, for our purposes is that the mechanisms proposed
to account for these aspects of temporal order perception latch onto their content in ways that
differ from how SDN or SET models latch onto their content. Furthermore, not only do they
exploit different representational strategies to get at their respective properties in the world,
they exploit different properties of neural systems to encode this information. In both cases tem-
poral information is given a spatial code—the distribution of activity across a population
encodes the relevant information—however, the mappings from spatial patterns to temporal
contents differ. A consumer system capable of using the information concerning an interval
length encoded in one of these timekeeping systems need not be in any position to us the infor-
mation encoded in the other. This is even the case if the consumer system is causally sensitive
to the activity in both networks. Causal sensitivity is not enough to make use of the informa-
tion. Consumer system must be able to decode these causal influences.
At this point we can discharge the argument. Temporal perception is fragmented. It is not a
single capacity, but is instead composed of various specialized timekeeping capacities. When we
try and account for these distinct capacities, not only do the capacities themselves seem to
demand different things of the models that would account for them, but the models of these
capacities that are currently being developed describe mechanisms that latch onto and encode
temporal information in a variety of ways. As a result, the standard approaches to the perceived
unity of time are bound to fail. No general story is forthcoming for how perception attributes
temporal properties to perceived events and existing empirical evidence suggests that no such
story is possible. Another strategy is needed to explain how the perceived unity of time emerges
from our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities.
5 | PARALLELS BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE
One plausible means of making progress on understanding how temporal information is inte-
grated across and within modalities is to look at spatial perception. In both cases, we seem
to perceive the world as consisting in unified or seamless dimensions within which perceived
events and objects are located. Furthermore, these aspects of perception depend on the inte-
gration of information initially encoded in multiple representational mechanisms. In this sec-
tion, I will argue that despite their superficial functional similarities, explanations of how
spatial information is integrated within and across modalities cannot be applied to the tem-
poral case. To show this, we will begin by focusing on the perception of visual space before
turning to the multimodal case.
The visual system parses the incoming retinal signal through a series of specialized filter-
ing mechanisms that preferentially respond to specific stimulus features such as orientation,
direction of motion, depth, color, and so forth. Many of the cortical systems responsible for
processing these features have a map-like retinotopic structure where adjacent locations in
the cortical maps encode information corresponding to adjacent retinal locations (Gardner,
Merriam, Movshon, & Heeger, 2008; Wandell, Dumoulin, & Brewer, 2007). Despite this
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initial feature segregation, we nevertheless perceive these features as being located within a
common space. Visual space appears unified. While there is disagreement over the details,
the general story for how spatial information is integrated in early vision is largely accepted.
The story appeals to two aspects of how spatial information is encoded in retinopic maps
(Robertson, 2003).
First, since each map shares a common retinotopic structure, and therefore represents the
same visual space, the process of integrating spatial information in vision is one of coordinating
the different retinotopic maps. An analogy for thinking about this integration is to think of
coordinating map layers in a computer program. As long as the map layers share a common for-
mat, then integrating them can be accomplished by functionally superimposing one on the
other. All that's needed are common landmarks, or anchor points, across the maps to line up
the layers.
Second, simultaneous activity across these maps guides their coordination. The visual sys-
tem exploits the assumption that simultaneous activity patterns across maps results from co-
instantiation of features by objects. For instance, in a simplified case, if there are simultaneous
spikes of activity in the color map and the motion map, then the visual system will behave as
though there is a common colored and moving object rather than independent instantiations of
color and motion. It is these simultaneity activity patterns, that at least in development, act as
anchor points for coordinating the distinct visual feature maps. In many accounts, this coordi-
nation produces mappings between feature maps and a retinotopic master map in which bound
feature groups (or objects) are constructed (Koch & Ullman, 1985; Robertson, 2003).
Comparability, for visual space, is given by the common retinotopic structure of the visual
maps, and localization is given by the coordination of these maps. Notice, that an account of
how visual features are represented does not provide an account of the unity of visual space.
These representations must be integrated.
However, neither of the structural features of spatial representations exploited by models of
spatial integration have analogs in the temporal case. First, there is no analog to retinotopy
across the different timekeeping mechanisms in perception.24 Second, simultaneity of sensory
processes cannot be used as anchor points to coordinate the different timekeeping mechanisms.
As we saw, in some cases the temporal contents of perception come apart from the temporal
structure of perceptual processes. Sensory processes with identical temporal structure can repre-
sent events as standing in radically different temporal relations. Therefore, the story given for
the integration of spatial information in vision cannot be applied to temporal perception.
The multimodal case is similar. There is a unity to our multimodal perception of space—the
various senses locate objects within a common space around the individual. It cannot be the
case that this integration is entirely accounted for by exploiting a common map-like structure
(let alone retinotopic structure), since different sensory modalities utilize different structured
representations of space. A further complication is that there are multiple systems for integrat-
ing spatial information across modalities.25
Of particular interest to us is the role of the parietal cortex in the representation of peri-
personal space (i.e., the space immediately surrounding the body) (Sereno & Huang, 2014).
24Holcombe (2015) makes similar points. Retinotopic maps carry information about a shared spatial visual space and
retinotopic structure facilitates the utilization of this information. That initial sensory areas may carry temporal
information through resemblance is not enough to establish a parallel to retinotopy.
25Not discussed here are the superior colliculus (King, 2004) and entorhinal cortex (Soman, Muralidharan, &
Chakravarthy, 2018). Both cases exploit map-like spatial representations that have no temporal analogs.
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Despite this system integrating information across modalities, the explanation of this integration
parallels the explanation in the visual case. Neurons in the postcentral gyrus (along with other
areas) integrate multisensory signals where their responses to multisensory signals from a given
location exceed the sum of the activation elicited by single sensory signals. This integration is
thought to occur through a two-stage process. First, individual sensory modalities involve modal-
ity specific map-like representations of space. Then, through an exploitation of simultaneity
across these maps, correspondences are formed between the modality specific maps and the mul-
timodal map in parietal cortex (Bernasconi et al., 2018).26 We have essentially the same story as
we did in the visual case, the only difference is that the initial modality specific spatial maps are
differently structured. However, simultaneity across cortical maps is essential to the process.
The point of this section is not to deny that simultaneity will play a role in the integration of
temporal information. Neural integration is largely a story of the temporal and spatial conver-
gence of neural signals. However, in the temporal case, simultaneity plays a semantical role.
The various maps being integrated represent how the world is now. As a result, simultaneous
activity across these maps can produces a complex representation of the world right now. How-
ever, in the temporal case, there is no clear-cut relationship between the timing of sensory pro-
cesses and their temporal content. Yet, that is what would be needed to exploit simultaneity in
the same way as it is exploited in spatial integration. Some other, content sensitive, explanation
is needed for the integration of temporal information.27
6 | TOWARDS THE PERCEIVED UNITY OF TIME
Standard explanations of the perceived unity of time fail. We also cannot simply import models
of spatial integration to the temporal domain. The empirical evidence described so far also
shows that we cannot account for the perceived unity of time by simply introducing further
clock mechanisms. Internal clocks track the temporal properties of internal mental processes.
Yet, the temporal structure of perceptual processes comes apart from their temporal contents.
Whatever account of the perceived unity of time we give must be sensitive to the temporal con-
tents of perception and not merely the timing of perceptual processes. We need something new.
While it is not clear what allows for the construction of the perceived unity of time, this is for
future interdisciplinary research, what we can do is articulate the hurdles that must be overcome
in accounting for the perceived unity of time from our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities.
6.1 | Temporal localization
Standard approaches attempted to explain localization by appealing to the timing of sensory
processes. The central reason why these approaches failed is that the perceiving temporal loca-
tion of events comes apart from the timing of sensory processes. Simply adding more attributive
machinery will not help either. We may come to know that some event has a certain duration
26The development of the superior colliculus may give insight as to how modality specific maps are manipulated to
establish this correspondence. In that case, retinotopic maps in early development influence the structure of auditory
and haptic maps (Doubell, Skaliora, Baron, & King, 2003).
27Simultaneity might play this role integrating some timekeeping mechanisms, but it cannot do it for the full range
needed to account of the perceived unity of time.
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and that some event stands in certain relations to other events, but none of this specifies when
the event occurs relative to the current moment.28 Something must anchors events, and the
properties attributed to them, to particular moments in time.
Carlos Montemayor (2013) argues that an indexical component contributed by the percep-
tual mechanisms for detecting simultaneity plays this anchoring role.29 Our perceptual system
is capable of representing events, separated by as much as 240 ms, as occurring simultaneously.
Montemayor argues that this temporal window of integration not only represents events as being
simultaneous but indexes them as occurring now. In this way, perceptual timekeeping mecha-
nism possess a referential/indexical function in addition their attributive functions, that locates
events in time relative to now.
Montemayor's proposal is clearly on the right track. Its success does not require a universal
mapping between the temporal contents of perception and the timing of perceptual processes—
there need only be one system that contributes this indexical component. However, it leaves
unexplained why the world appears to have a single temporal dimension as opposed to multi-
ple. We indexically locate ourselves as located here, but the world appears to have three spatial
dimensions. Something beyond a mere indexical is needed to account for the dimensionality of
localization. Providing an explanation of this referential component and the dimensionality of
temporal perception is the first hurdle that must be overcome.
6.2 | Comparability and translation
Comparability requires something other than what is required by localization. An account of
comparability must provide translation procedures by which individual consumer systems can
use the temporal information carried in various formats by different timekeeping mechanisms.
One possibility is that there is a single code, either an amodal code or the coding scheme for
one modality takes priority, into which the distinct temporal representations are translated,
which consumer systems then utilize. Another possibility is that consumer systems might have
their own propriety codes, suited for their particular needs (e.g., motor control vs. lexicalization),
into which they translate various temporal representations. These are open empirical possibilities
for future research required to explain the perceived unity of time. Furthermore, how we account
for this translation might answer the temporal version of Molyneux's question (e.g., whether or
not there is a common code for temporal information and whether or not the capacity to inte-
grate this information is innate or acquired).
Once again, we find an aspect of the perceived unity of time that cannot be solved by intro-
ducing further clock mechanisms. Whatever account of translation we provide must be one that
while operating on the local non-semantic properties of neural systems, must nonetheless
respect their semantic content.
A final point is needed. There are three broad-stroke options we can adopt to explain the
perceived unity of time. Unity might depend on a single unified representation of time that inte-
grates the information encoded in peripheral timekeeping mechanisms. This unitary represen-
tation of time may then play the causal/function role of a unified experience of time that is
utilized by consumer systems, including those involved in introspection. Therefore, despite per-
ceptual processes that underpin temporal perception being fragmented, temporal experience
28The similarities with Perry (1979) are intended.
29Maniadakis and Trahanias (2016) provides a similar account. The same worry applies to their view as well.
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might be unified (under a certain reading of unity). Another option is that fragmentation
extends beyond mere perceptual processing and applies to experience as well. Again, there may
be a single representational system that integrates information in peripheral timekeeping mech-
anisms, but this representation only provides experience with multimodal and cross-timescale
temporal content. Other temporal content may be contributed through the operation of the
peripheral timekeepers. Knocking out this central integrator would result in selectively
knocking out experiences of integrated temporal properties while leaving non-integrated tem-
poral experiences intact.30 Alternatively, there may simply be no single integrated representa-
tion of time and we account for the perceived unity of time without a single place where it all
comes together. The consumer systems that drive time sensitive behaviors may employ various
integrated representations of time. As long as they are coordinated, then reflective and behav-
ioral responses will appear coherent. On this construal, while time may strike us as unified in
the ways that I described, there may not be a single unified representation of time on the basis
of which time strikes us so.31
7 | CONCLUSION
The world appears to have a unified temporal structure. The observation of the world appearing
this way may tempt us to believe that temporal perception, or experience, is unified or unitary.
However, this is not so. Temporal perception is initially fragmented. The perceived unity of
time is constructed from these fragmented capacities. However, at present there is no theory
that explains this unity. Something new is needed. Specifying what this is requires new work.
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